

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT

NOTE: This document contains information affecting the national defense of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws, Title 18, U.S.C., Sec. 793 and 794. The transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(Classification and Control Markings)

This report contains unprocessed information. Plans and/or policies should not be evolved or modified solely on the basis of this report.

1. COUNTRY: BRAZIL

8. REPORT NUMBER: [REDACTED]

2. SUBJECT: (U) "Democratic Openings"

9. DATE OF REPORT: 31 July 1970

3. ISC NUMBER:

10. NO. OF PAGES: 4

11. REFERENCES: [REDACTED]

4. DATE OF INFORMATION: Oct 69 - Jul 70

12. ORIGINATOR: [REDACTED]

5. PLACE AND DATE OF ACQ: Rio de Janeiro
14 July 1970

13. PREPARED BY:

6. EVALUATION: SOURCE B INFORMATION 2

APPROVING AUTHORITY: [REDACTED]

18. SUMMARY:

(U) This IR discusses an influential officer's firm belief that the MEDICI Administration has embarked Brazil on a course of viable Brazilian democracy.

(Leave Blank)

50X1 HUMINT

CONSULATE OF THE UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA

AUG 28 1970

BELEM, PARA, BRAZIL

1. (U) [REDACTED] displayed enthusiasm during our conversation for what he repeatedly identified as "indicators of true democracy". He was especially pleased over President MEDICI's recognition of the role of the political element in Brazilian society. According to the Colonel, "MEDICI doesn't have any more love for politicians than COSTA E SILVA, but he is aware of the need for escape valves in contemporary societies, and recognizes such an outlet in responsible politics." Source also said that MEDICI was often shocked by the outrageous way in which the late President treated politicians. MEDICI reportedly concluded that it was possible to reconcile the need for cleansing the deplorable pre-1964 brand of destructive political chicanery with meaningful dialogue designed to sustain the dignity, motivation, and

16. DISTRIBUTION BY ORIGINATOR:

17. DOWNGRADING DATA:

18. ATTACHMENT DATA:

USCINCSO (J-2)
COMUSARSO (G-2)AmCon, Belem
AmCon, Belo Horizonte

AmCon, Porto Alegre

ConGen, Recife

ConGen, Sao Paulo

AmEmb, Brasilia

COMUSMILGP, Rio

Charge Commercial Cons

POL USIS

POL-R AID

ECON

SciAtt

GROUP 3
DOWNGRADED AT 12 YEAR INTER-
VALS; NOT AUTOMATICALLY
DECLASSIFIED.~~CONFIDENTIAL~~Declassified Authority:
43265 By: Amanda Weimer
Date: 05/07-2015~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT

CONTINUATION SHEET

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(Classification and Control Markings)

REPORT NO.
PAGE 2 OF 4 PAGES
ORIGINATOR

(Leave Blank)

public standing of the political class.

2. (U) In source's view, the President has established his political leadership with rare courage and wisdom. Even though most military officers oppose the concept of active duty personnel engaging in partisan politics, he said, some of the older and more senior individuals tend to flirt with the idea. He attributed this to a desire to postpone both the eclipse from prominence and the loss of fringe benefits that occur with retirement. Still another factor is that senior area commanders become deeply involved locally and often are wooed by ambitious politicians. In some cases, politicians know before hand that the local commander has neither the desire nor the capability to gain office but launch trial balloons in his behalf anyway, in order to gain the senior military man's support for their own political designs. The above combinations confronted President MEDICI with military trial balloons in almost every state. The following are but a few examples:

Guanabara

General SYSENO Sarmento, CG, 1st Army

Rio de Janeiro

Colonel Francisco Homem de CARVALHO, Army General Staff and Former State Secretary of Security

Minas Gerais

General ITIBERE Gouvea do Amaral, CG, 4th Military Region

Rio Grande do Norte

General Dioscoro Goncalves VALE, CG, 12th Military Region

Rio Grande do Sul

Colonel Ieo Guedes ETCHEGOYEN, President's Military Staff

Maranhao

Colonel Iauro Rocca DIEGUEZ, President's Military Staff

Parana

General Florimar CAMPELLO, CG, 5th Division Artillery

General Jose Campos de ARAGAO, CG, 5th Military Region

50X1, HUMINT

the President ignored all such efforts and did not endorse a single active duty officer for office. Moreover, he chose civilian politicians over much safer (in military terms) candidates who possessed impressive military credentials. In this category he listed the President's choice of Congressman Leon PERES over Senator (and retired General) Ney BRAGA in Parana, and of Congressman PADILHA over Senator (and retired Marshal) Paulo TORRES in Rio de Janeiro State.

3. (C) The officer who supplied most of the basis for this report is but one of many who have pointed out that the President ignored the generally known political preferences of three of the four Army Commanders. One of them, General CANAVARRO of the 2nd Army in Sao Paulo, is especially close to the President and is known to have aired his views in very candid fashion on several occasions. He was

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT

CONTINUATION SHEET

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(Classification and Control Markings)

REPORT NO.

PAGE

ORIGINATOR

2 OF 4 PAGES

(Leave Blank)

bitterly opposed to the man chosen by MEDICI - Laudo NATEL - and was joined in his opposition by almost every general officer of the Sao Paulo Garrison. Notwithstanding those pressures - which were fanned by incumbent Governor SODRE and most traditional Sao Paulo politicians - the President stuck to his guns. In Guanabara, Rio de Janeiro, and Minas Gerais States, all within General SYSENO's jurisdiction, SYSENO has confirmed to me that he deplores the presidential choices in all three states. Moreover, reliable presidential staff sources say that SYSENO personally asked President MEDICI for the Guanabara slot for himself. The final 4-star General to challenge presidential judgment was General CANDAL, 4th Army CG, who reportedly manifested such vitriolic objection to Governor-designate GUEIROS for Pernambuco State that GUEIROS threatened not to run and the President personally reprimanded General CANDAL.

4. (U) Aside from sustained dialogue with politicians and firmness in favoring a substantial number of the political class with gubernatorial nods, source identified other MEDICI actions designed to establish a solid base for "decent democracy". He cited the following:

- a. Reopening of State Legislatures.
- b. Selection of an opposition politician as the candidate for Governor in militarily sensitive Guanabara State.
- c. Moderation in the application of Institutional Act No. 5 against politicians.
- d. Emergence of an electoral code which requires parties to nominate three candidates for every available office in the 15 November 1970 elections. This provision will provide ample opportunity for any qualified citizen with political ambition and offers prospects for infusions of "new blood" into the political system.
- e. Appearance before Congress of cabinet officers in an attempt to dignify and reinforce one of the most important aspects of democratic executive-legislative relationships.
- f. Agreement by the Executive Branch (Justice Minister) to convene the Human Rights Commission in response to pleas by the minority party leadership and others opposed to the government.
- g. Moderation by the Executive in connection with the steady stream of provocative diatribes by Bishop HELDER Camara.
- h. Insistence by the President in following the Constitutional provision that this Fall's elections for federal, state, and municipal legislatures be accomplished through direct popular vote. In furtherance of this determination, he has refrained from any involvement by the Executive in the selection of candidates. Moreover, it is likely that MEDICI will exercise a close check on military officers who become overly concerned with local electoral contests and the participating candidates.
- i. Firm action by the President and Justice Minister in responding to political pressures for an investigation of the notorious vigilante-type "Death Squadrons".

CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT

CONTINUATION SHEET

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(Classification and Control Markings)

REPORT NO.

PAGE

4

ORIGINATOR

PAGES

j. The substantial numbers of individuals absolved by the courts on charges of political dissent. Source said that the fact that military courts have thrown out cases involving such notoriously anti-government and pro-left radicals as journalists Antonio CALIADO and Enio SILVEIRA confirms the growing tolerance toward political opposition.

(Leave Blank)

k. Mention also was made of the abundant criticism of the government appearing in daily news media.

COMMENT: (+) Source shares a clearly discernible conviction among broad areas of the officer corps that the 1964 Revolution now has the economic breathing room and a President with sufficient popular identification to permit giving serious attention to the political system. There appears to be a belief that the morass of corruption, subversion, and ineffectiveness of the political status quo ante (1964) has been adequately cleansed and that the moment is opportune for positive actions in political terms. It would be imprudent, however, to conclude that there is any room in the "democratic openings" mood for the likes of Dom HELDER Camara, Miguel ARRAES; Marcio Moreira ALVES, Joao GOULART, Juscelino KUBITSCHKE, Leonel BRIZOLA, etc. Sources generally attach certain qualifications to the "new breed" of politician:

- a. University-level education.
- b. Preferably in the 30-45 age group.
- c. Tested in public administration or private sector management.
- d. Preferably uninvolved with past partisan politics.
- e. Demonstrated concern for the welfare of society as a whole rather than narrow or corrupt self-interest.
- f. Divorced from conflict-of-interests temptations.
- g. Responsible in terms of constructive rather than destructive public statements and actions. There appears to be little disposition to tolerate past demagoguery, particularly in areas in which such irresponsibility might have a negative bearing on economic or security situations.

CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~